CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENTS
Professor Antonia H. Chayes
Class I – January 20, 2010
INTRODUCTION and Broad overview: Scope of the problems – Themes For the seminar
A. What are the major problems in civil-military cooperation in post-conflict environments that we want to address in this course? (You may notice that this has become an enormously “hot topic”, with incredible amounts of material produced almost daily. Given that fact, we need to deepen our understanding of why this is the case, and keep a class blog going to keep abreast of developments).
B. Can we unpack every part of the question? “cooperation?” “post-conflict”? Should we be concerned with roles and missions? Different cultures? Leadership issues? Disproportionate resources? The changing nature of war and its ending?
C. What is the recent experience of the civil-military relationship in immediate post-conflict societies since the end of the Cold War? The scope must include at least the following intersections:
a. National military forces and international security forces; military and development/IGO officials; military and local population; military and local governance; military and IGO; military and NGOs; IGOs and NGOs – etc.
D. Why focus on post-conflict? Is there a clear post-conflict environment? If not, how should it be characterized?
E. What are shared and what might be conflicting views of civil-military cooperation?
F. How can civil-military relationships be strengthened in the prevention phase before conflict turns violent? During conflict? How do issues and the players in civil-military negotiation and cooperation differ at different points in a conflict?
G. To what extent, if at all, does law prescribe these relationships? (International laws that deal with security and governance? Humanitarian laws and laws of war, including customary international law (CIL); UN Charter, Regional charters, Security Council Resolutions? SOFAs? ROE? Domestic constitutions and domestic legislation? etc.)
H. Are there actual theories about civil-military coordination in post-conflict situations or only doctrine and policy recommendations?
I. To what extent is the relationship governed by the context of the conflict?
READINGS
§ Smith, Rupert, The Utility of Force, (Vintage Books: NY, 2008), Read Introduction (pp. 3-28) and Conclusion (pp. 374-416). (Review if you have already read for another purpose).
§ De Coning, Cedric. “Civil-military Coordination and Complex Peacebuilding Systems,” in Civil-Military Cooperation in Post-Conflict Operations: Emerging Theory and Practice, Ankersen, Christopher ed., (Routledge: NY, 2008), Chapter 4 (pp. 52-74).
§ Paris, Roland, “Understanding the “Coordination Problem” in Postwar Statebuilding, in The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations, Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk eds, (New York: Taylor & Francis, 2009), Chapter 3 (pp. 53-78).
ESSENTIAL DOCUMENTS
Please review the following documents within the first few weeks of the courses if you are not already familiar with them. We will refer to these documents during the course.
§ PDD-56, “Managing Complex Contingency Operations,” May 1997.
§ NSPD-44 “Management of Interagency Efforts Concerning Reconstruction and Stabilization,” December 7, 2005.
§ DoD Directive 3000.05, “Military Support for Stability, Security, Transition and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations,” November 28, 2005.
§ PPD-1, “Organization of the National Security Council System,” February 13, 2009.
§ United Nations. “United Nations Integrated Missions Planning Process (IMPP) Guidelines Endorsed by the Secretary General on June 13, 2006.”
§ United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance, “Civil-Military Guidelines and Reference for Complex Emergencies,” September 2008.
§ NATO Allied Joint Publication (AJP) 3.4.1 “Peace Support Operations.”
§ United States Army, Stability Operations FM3-07, October 2008, Chapter 3.
§ United States Army, U.S. Army Counterinsurgency Operations: FM 3-24, December 2006, Read Chapter 2; Skim Chapter 1.
§ U.S. State Department Office of Coordination and Reconstruction, “Post-Conflict Reconstruction Essential Tasks,” April 2005.
OPTIONAL – BACKGROUND AND DEEPER READING
§ Paris, Roland and Timothy Sisk, “Introduction: Understanding the Contradictions of Postwar Statebuilding”, in The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations, Paris, Roland and Timothy Sisk eds, (New York: Taylor & Francis), Introduction (pp. 1-20).
§ Durch, William J., UN Peacekeeping, American Policy and the Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, (Palgrave Macmillan, 1996), Chapter 1-2.
§ Dobbins, James et. al., After the War: Nation-building from FDR to George W. Bush, (Santa Monica: RAND, 2008), http://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2008/RAND_MG716.pdf. Read “Conclusions” from the Summary (pp. xxiv-xxix).
Class II – January 27, 2010
Defining the PROBLEMS: How did we get where we are today? EXHORTATION WITHOUT PROGRESS?
Divide class into teams for CLASS III
A. What efforts have been made thus far?
a. Many reports from nations and international groups
b. Security and international policy and politics literature
B. What progress can be shown? What institutional changes within/across governments and in IGOs have actually occurred (e.g., S/CRS, World Bank, EU) and within armed forces (civil-military exercises, Fort Polk, Garmisch))? Why is progress in these areas so hard to achieve?
C. What is the nature of any reluctance or resistance?
D. How does the current security environment challenge previous thinking of 1990s through 9/11?
E. The current security environment – “Not War not Peace”: Is it possible to pursue a policy of simultaneity of war-fighting and peace and nation building?
F. How are the objectives defined?
G. What is the meaning of “victory” in such a context? Of defeat?
READINGS
EXHORTATIONS
UNITED STATES
§ Chayes, Antonia Handler and Abram Chayes, “The Dimensions of the Problem,” Planning for Intervention: International Cooperation in Conflict Management, (Kluwer Law International, 1999), Chapter 2 (pp. 9-46). Skim this reading.
§ Michele A. Flournoy, “Achieving Unity of Effort in Interagency Operations.” Hearing on Prospects for Effective Interagency Collaboration on National Security, House Armed Services Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, January 29, 2008.
§ Orr, Robert C., ed., “The United States as Nation Builder: Facing the Challenge of Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” in Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction, Robert C. Orr ed., (Washington D.C.: CSIS), Chapter 1 (pp. 3-18).
NATO
§ Jakobsen, Peter Viggo, “NATO’s Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Response Operations: A Work in Slow Progress,” DIIS Report 2008:15 (Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 2008), (pp. 7-40). Skim this reading.
UNITED NATIONS
§ A/63/881-S/2009/304. “Report of the Secretary-General on Peace-building in the Immediate Aftermath of Conflict,” June 11, 2009.
§ Berdal, Mats, “Building Peace After War”, Adelphi Paper 407, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, IISS, 2009), Chapter 3 (pp. 135-169).
§ Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Implementing United Nations Multidimensional and Integrated Peace Operations,” A Report on Findings and Recommendations, May 2008, http://www.regjeringen.no/upload/UD/Vedlegg/FN/final_operations.pdf. Skim this reading.
OPTIONAL – BACKGROUND AND DEEPER READING
§ Campbell, Susanna and Anja T. Kaspersen, “The UN’s Reforms: Confronting Integration Barriers,” International Peacekeeping, vol. 15, no. 4, August 2008, (pp. 470-485).
§ Gates, Robert. “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New Age” Foreign Affairs, 88, no.1 (2009).
§ Suhrke, Astri and Arne Strand, “The Logic of Peacebuilding,” in After the Conflict: Reconstruction and Development in the Aftermath of War, Sultan Barakat ed., (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), (pp. 141-154).
Class III – February 3, 2010
“NOT WAR NOT PEACE” – WHAT ARE THE PREDICTABLE TASKS THAT CAN BE PLANNED FOR?
A. Are there predictable generic tasks? What are some predictable generic tasks for which planning might be wise? At what point do we see a planning process? At what level and by which organizations? Is it likely to be civil-military or “stovepipe” or only military planning?
B. Are some tasks inherently military? Are some inherently civilian? Are some clearly combined? The areas that follow are necessarily interconnected and overlapping – they are also not complete, but enough for two classes!
a. Establishing security
b. Security sector reform
c. Enforcing a peace agreement
d. DDR
e. Anti-corruption efforts
f. Establishing basic rule of law
· Civil Police (part of security and/or the rule of law?)
g. Helping establish stable government; (Re)building basic governance institutions
h. Elections
i. Infrastructure repair; restoring basic services (health, sanitation, banking, education)
j. Economic development? This is a sphere in which both military and civilians have influence and routinely clash in terms of priorities and philosophies.
C. What leadership configurations are seen? UN: SRSG; National militaries, different leadership for different tasks? How great is the variation? Should it differ from case to case? How does civil-military cooperation vary with leadership assignments?
D. Are the measures of progress/success in civil-military cooperation—in post conflict areas generally? In specific functional areas in certain conflicts?
Student Team Presentations: Each team must pick a conflict area and sketch out how at least three of the generic tasks were handled there, with a critique or back-patting for what you found in your research. You are not confined to the list above if you conclude there are other equally important generic tasks. [Sample cases: Bosnia, Somalia, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, DRC, East Timor, the Marshall Plan? Others may be chosen]
READINGS
GENERAL
Note that specific areas of cooperation (or lack of) are listed in Class IV with some useful – but not exhaustive – readings
§ “Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction.” United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. 2009. Read Chapters 1 and 3; Skim Chapters 4 and 5.
§ Durch, William J. and Tobias Berkman, “Restoring and Maintaining Peace: What We Know So Far,” in Twenty-first Century Peace Operations, William Durch ed., (Washington D.C.: USIP, 2006), (pp. 1-48).
§ Patrick, Stewart and Kaysie Brown, The Pentagon and Global Development: Making Sense of the DOD’s Expanding Role, Center for Global Development, Working Paper No. 131, November 2007.
§ Schneckener, Ullrich, International Statebuilding: Dilemmas, Strategies, and Challenges for German Foreign Policy, SWP Research Paper, October 2007. Skim only for German perspective.
§ Sewer, Daniel and Patricia Thompson. “A Framework for Success: International Intervention and Societies Emerging from Conflict.” Leashing the Dogs of War. Chester A. Crocker, ed, et. al. USIP, 2007. Chapter 21 (pp. 369-387). Skim this reading.
§ Macrae, Joanne, ed., “The New Humanitarianisms: A Review of Trends in Global Humanitarian Action,” Humanitarian Policy Group, no. 11, April 2002, chapter 1.
OPTIONAL – BACKGROUND AND DEEPER READING
§ Toft, Monica Duffy, Securing the Peace: The Durable Settlement of Civil Wars, (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2009), Introduction, (pp. 1-18).
§ Berdal, Mats, “Building Peace After War”, Adelphi Paper 407, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, IISS, 2009). (Specific chapters will be selected for Class IV).
Class IV – February 10, 2010 – (Continuation from Class III)
SEEKING critical NODES FOR COOPERATION: MANDATES, PEACE AGREEMENTS, ELECTIONS, ANTI-CORRUPTION EFFORTS
A. What have been some principal nodes for cooperation among some of the predictable tasks?
B. Is the civil-military mix likely to be different depending on context of the conflict, the battlefield, and type of agreement sought? Who negotiates a cease-fire, or a detailed peace agreement in various contexts? What are the forms of negotiation? Are both civilian and military elements on all sides, including international interveners “necessary parties?” Do peace agreements usually provide an implementable framework? Should they? If not, how and who should interpret it? (Discussion of various possible nodes from case presentations.)
C. How does the mismatch of resources – both monetary and personnel affect cooperation on critical nodes? Does it defy logic? (Return to the problem of planning for predictable tasks and seeking greater cooperation)
D. Cases: continuation and discussion of student team presentations
READINGS
Please do the readings that pertain to your presentation. You should focus on at least three of the areas outlined both earlier and below. Please note that these are suggestive readings; you may find others that are more pertinent to your case study.
PEACE AGREEMENTS
§ Christine Bell, “Peace Agreements and Human Rights,” (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), Chapter 2 (pp. 15-35) and Chapter 4 (only pp. 91-117).
DDR
§ Spear, Joanna, “Disarmament and Demobilization,” in Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements, Stephen Stedman, Donald Rothschild and Elizabeth Cousens, eds. (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reimer Press, 2002), Chapter 6 (pp. 141-182).
§ Berdal, Mats “Disarmament and Demobilization After Civil Wars” Adelphi Paper 303, (Oxford University Press, IISS 1996). Read Sections I, II, and Conclusion.
§ Berdal, Mats, “Building Peace After War”, Adelphi Paper 407, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, IISS, 2009), Read pp. 58-71 only.
RULE OF LAW
§ Stromseth, Jane, David Wippman and Rosa Brooks. Can Might Make Rights?: Building Rule of Law after Military Interventions. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), Chapter 6 (pp. 178-227).
PUBLIC ORDER AND CIVIL POLICE
§ “Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction.” United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. 2009. Chapter 7.
ANTI-CORRUPTION
§ “Draft Action Plan to Counter State Corruption,” ISAF, July 17, 2009. (Unclassified version)
FOSTERING A STABLE GOVERNMENT AND ELECTIONS
§ Berdal, Mats, “Building Peace After War”, Adelphi Paper 407, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, IISS, 2009), Read pp. 121-128 only.
§ Ottaway, Marina, “Promoting Democracy after Conflict: The Difficult Choices,” International Studies Perspectives, no. 4, (2003), (pp. 314-322).
ECONOMIC RECOVERY AND FOSTERING A SUSTAINABLE ECONOMY
§ “Guiding Principles for Stabilization and Reconstruction.” United States Institute of Peace and United States Army Peacekeeping and Stability Operations Institute. 2009. Chapter 8.
§ Berdal, Mats, “Building Peace After War,” Adelphi Paper 407, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, IISS, 2009), Read pp. 77-85 and 128-131 only.
OPTIONAL – BACKGROUND AND DEEPER READING
§ Zakaria, Fareed, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," Foreign Affairs (Vol. 76, No. 6) November/December 1997.
§ Paris, Paris, At War’s End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), Chapters 2, 10.
CLASS V – FEBRUARY 24, 2010 (No Class on February 17 due to holiday schedule)
HOW HAVE NEW APPROACHES FORGED IN IRAQ AND AFGHANISTAN AFFECTED THINKING AND ACTION ABOUT CIV-MIL COOPERATION?
A. How does Counterinsurgency Doctrine affect civilian cooperation? Is COIN a feasible strategy on the ground or in policy circles? Are there resource constraints?
B. What role does funding imbalance between civil and military budgets play?
C. What happens when the military does not have guidance on a political strategy?
D. What demands on the actors have changed? Have ingrained civil or military attitudes changed?
E. Does counterinsurgency doctrine hang together conceptually in the current security environment? What are the theoretical implications of conducting counterinsurgency in the absence of significant formal state institutions? In other words, how can counterinsurgency and state-building be undertaken at the same time?
F. Deeper discussion of the players: differences among US, UK and European as well as other nations and UN in a changed post-conflict environment.
G. What is the legitimate role of contractors? Can they be held accountable?
READINGS
§ Komer, Robert, Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S.-G.V.N Performance in Vietnam (Santa Monica: RAND, 1972), http://www.rand.org/pubs/reports/2005/R967.pdf, Read Summary (pp. v-xiii).
§ Martel, William, Victory in War: Foundations of Modern Military Policy, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), Chapter 2.
§ McNerney, Michael, “CIMIC on the Edge: Afghanistan and the Evolution of Civil-Military Operations,” in Civil-Military Cooperation in Post-Conflict Operations: Emerging Theory and Practice, Ankersen, Christopher ed., (New York: Routledge, 2008), Chapter 8 (pp. 173-197).
§ Petraeus, David, “Learning COIN: Observations from Soldiering in Iraq.” Military Review 86.1 (Jan-Feb 2006), (pp. 2-12).
§ Allen, LtGen John R. “Anbar Dawn: the defeat of al Qaeda in the west,” Lecture delivered at The Fletcher School, March 11, 2009. (Half the class teams will read this).
§ Rietjens, Sebastian, “A Management Perspective on Co-operation between Military an Civilian Actors in Afghanistan,” in Civil-Military Cooperation in Post-Conflict Operations: Emerging Theory and Practice, Ankersen, Christopher ed., (New York: Routledge, 2008), Chapter 5 (pp. 75-99). (Half the class teams will read this).
§ Orr, Robert C. and Johanna Mendelson-Forman, “Funding and Post-Conflict Reconstruction,” in Winning the Peace: An American Strategy for Post-Conflict Reconstruction, (Center for Strategic International Studies, 2004), Chapter 10 (pp. 138-165). Skim this reading.
§ “The Real State-Defense Turf War Begins.” Foreign Policy. http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/11/03/the_real_state_defense_turf_war_begins.
§ Lehnardt, Chia, “Peacekeeping,” in Private Security, Public Order: The Outsourcing of Public Services and Its Limits, Simon Chesterman and Angelina Fisher, eds, (Oxford University Press, 2010), Chapter 10 (pp. 205-221).
OPTIONAL – BACKGROUND AND DEEPER READING
§ Isenberg, David, “A Government in Search of Cover: Private Military Companies in Iraq,” in From Mercenaries to Market: The Rise and Regulation of Private Military Companies, Simon Chesterman and Chia Lehnardt, eds, (Oxford University Press, 2007), Chapter 5 (pp. 82-93).
§ Chesterman, Simon and Angelina Fisher, “Conclusion: Private Security, Public Order,” in Private Security, Public Order: The Outsourcing of Public Services and Its Limits, Simon Chesterman and Angelina Fisher, eds, (Oxford University Press, 2010), (pp. 222-226).
§ Anderson, Claudia, “Getting to Know You: the U.S. Military Maps the Human Terrain of Afghanistan,” The Weekly Standard, vol. 15, no. 17, January 18, 2010.
CLASS VI – MARCH 3, 2010
NOT WAR NOT PEACE: WHAT ARE THE GOALS?
GUEST FACULTY: Professor Susan Woodward
Prepare for Class VII – Iraq #1 Presentation – Divide class groups to report on the Department of Defense, State Department/U.S. Embassy, ORHA, and CPA
A. Emphasis on moving from Peace-building to Nation-building: Democratization v. Minimalism
B. Allocation of tasks amongst all participating civilian and military actors
C. Establishing governance
READINGS
§ Woodward, Susan L., “State-building Operations: International v. Local Legitimacy?” presented at Nation-Building, State-Building and International Intervention: Between ‘Liberation’ and Symptom Relief, Centre d’Etudes et Recherche Internationale and Critique Internationale, Paris (October 15, 2004).
§ Englebert, Pierre and Denis M. Tull, “Postconflict Reconstruction in Africa: Flawed Ideas about Failed States,” International Security, vol. 32, no. 4, Spring 2008 (pp. 106-139).
§ Suhrke, Astri, “The Dangers of a Tight Embrace: Externally Assisted Statebuilding in Afghanistan,” in The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the Contradictions of Postwar Peace Operations, Roland Paris and Timothy Sisk eds, (New York: Routledge, 2009), Chapter 10 (pp. 227-251).
OPTIONAL – BACKGROUND AND DEEPER READING
§ Suhrke, Astri, “Reconstruction as Modernization” 28 Third World Quarterly 1291 (2007).
CLASS VII – MARCH 10, 2010
CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN IRAQ: MORE WAR THAN PEACE: Rebuilding and fighting simultaneously: IRAQ
A. Case Study: Iraq 2003-2006
a. History of civil-military relations and action after Baghdad was toppled
· How failure to plan for any contingency after the immediate military success occurred
· What were the specific omissions and planning failures that led to the chaos, insurgency, and the creation of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia and Sunni-Shiite/Shiite-Shiite violence?
b. A short review of the events:
· The shutout of the State Department planning group: “The Future of Iraq” project
· The role of Chalabi, Jay Garner’s ORHA, followed by Bremer’s CPA
c. What was the military strategy?
d. Given the rise of violence so soon after the first flush of apparent military victory, who were and who are the civilian players in Iraq working on reconstruction, peace building and state building?
· In addition to the ORHA and CPA, and now the huge US embassy?
· The UN mission, though decimated, has reconstituted, in a modest fashion, and worked on various governance issues, such as constitutionalism and civil service, the disputed territories, and other items, but quite low key
· Civilian contractors
· Any NGOs? What other IGOs? And what interface with the military?
· Allied civilians?
· Potential investors, especially in petroleum sector
e. What is the form of interaction?
· What structural forms for cooperation have evolved?
· Are there local as well as green zone forms of cooperation?
· How different is the situation in Kurdish areas?
READINGS
§ “The Future of Iraq Project.” May 2002. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB198/index.htm. Review “Defense Policy and Institutions” and the working group recommendations.
§ Bensahel, Nora, et. al. “After Saddam: Prewar Planning and the Occupation of Iraq” RAND Corporation, June 2008.
§ Shultz, Richard and Andrea Dew, Insurgents, Terrorists and Militias: The Warriors of Contemporary Combat (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), Read pp. 225-256 only.
RELEVANT BOOKS FOR YOUR REPORT – PICK AND CHOOSE
§ Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. “Hard Lessons: The Iraq Reconstruction. Written by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction Experience.” (Choose sections relevant to your assignment).
§ Packer, George. The Assassin’s Gate: America in Iraq, (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2006).
§ Gordon, Michael and Bernard Trainor. Cobra II: The Inside Story of the Invasion and Occupation of Iraq, (New York: Pantheon Books, 2006).
§ Power, Samantha. Chasing the Flame: One Man’s Fight to Save the World. (New York: Penguin, 2008).
§ Bremer, L. Paul. My Year in Iraq: the Struggle to Build a Future of Hope. (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006).
§ Ricks, Thomas E. Fiasco: The American Military Adventure in Iraq, (New York: Penguin Group, 2006).
§ Ricks, Thomas E. The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq 2006-2008, (New York: Penguin Group, 2009).
§ Rajiv Chandrasekeran, Imperial Life in the Emerald City, Inside Iraq’s Green Zone, (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006).
Class VIII – MARCH 17, 2010
CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS IN A POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT BETWEEN PEACE AND WAR: STRATEGY CHANGE IN Rebuilding and fighting simultaneously – IRAQ 2
GUEST FACULTY: Professor Shultz
A. Iraq 2006-present
B. COIN v. counter-terrorism
C. What was the theory behind the surge? Was it a gamble? What made them think it would work?
D. Given the violence and kinetic activity, was it possible for civilian agencies to operate outside the Green Zone? If not, how can they reach the people?
E. Anbar counterinsurgency effort
a. Have reconstruction and peacebuilding effort been primarily military?
b. Is the military performing tasks usually done by civil agencies?
F. What has been the local involvement and ownership of these peacebuilding efforts?
READINGS
§ Readings from Professor Richard Shultz’s manuscript.
§ McMaster, H.R. “On War: Lessons to be Learned.” Survival. February 2008.
§ Ricks, Thomas E. The Gamble: General David Petraeus and the American Military Adventure in Iraq 2006-2008, (New York: Penguin Group, 2009), Chapters 5, 8 and Appendix C.
§ Petraeus, David H. General, “Report to Congress on the Situation in Iraq,” United States Congress, 10-11 September 2007.
§ McCary, John A. “Anbar Awakening: An Alliance of Incentives.” Washington Quarterly. January 2009.
§ Kilcullen, David. The Accidental Guerilla: Fighting Small Wars Amidst a Big One. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), Chapter 3 (pp. 116-185). Skim this reading.
OPTIONAL – BACKGROUND AND DEEPER READING
§ The Iraq Study Group Report, December 2006.
§ United States Government Accountability Office. “Rebuilding Iraq: Governance, Security, Reconstruction and Financial Challenges.” April 2006.
Class IX – March 31, 2010 (No class on March 24 due to Spring Break)
CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS IN A POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT BETWEEN PEACE AND WAR: THE EROSION OF PEACE building: AFGHANISTAN I
GUEST FACULTY: Dipali Mukhopadhyay
A. Is it fair to say that Afghanistan has never been governed? What were American and NATO nations’ assumptions about governance after the fall of the Taliban? Have they changed since 2001?
B. How did the military’s initial approach to its operations set civilians up to fail? Was this inevitable or avoidable and what does it say about the nature of post-conflict state-building in countries where foreign interests are multidimensional and potentially conflicted? What were the objectives of the military effort once the Taliban retreated? Was that retreat regarded as a “victory”? Did the force structure match stated objectives?
C. Was there a civil as well as military planning process in place before the initial attack? How different/similar to Iraq? Was there any cooperation between and among civil authorities and the military either in the United States or in NATO?
D. What were and are the elements of a more local strategy? Has there been such a strategy? How can support of governor-warlords be reconciled with nation building that is designed to strengthen the center?
READINGS
§ Chayes, Sarah, The Punishment of Virtue: Inside Afghanistan after the Taliban, (Penguin, 2006), Chapters 2, 9,10,17,18, 21.
§ Mukhopadhyay, Dipali, “Disguised Warlordism and Combatanthood in Balkh: the Persistence of Informal Power in the Formal Afghan State,” Conflict, Security and Development, vol. 9, no. 4 (Dec. 2009).
§ Suhrke, Astri, “Reconstruction as Modernization,” Third World Quarterly, vol. 28, no. 7, (2007).
§ Giustozzi, Antonio. “War and Peace Economies of Afghanistan’s Strongmen,” International Peacekeeping, vol. 14, no. 1.
OPTIONAL – BACKGROUND AND DEEPER READING
§ “Guidelines for the Interaction and Coordination of Humanitarian Actors and Military Actors in Afghanistan,” United Nations, May 20, 2008.
§ Nash, Roger, “Demarcation between Military and Humanitarian Activities in Afghanistan and the Role of Law,” Essex Human Rights Review, vol. 4, no. 2, (September 2007).
§ U.S. Department of State, “Rule-of-Law Programs in Afghanistan,” Office of the Inspector General, January 2008.
§ Sinno, Abdulkader H, Organizations at War in Afghanistan and Beyond, Cornell University Press, 2007.
§ Bhatia, Michael “The Future of the Mujahideen: Legitimacy, Legacy and Demobilization in Post-Bonn Afghanistan,” International Peacekeeping, vol. 14, no. 1, (January 2007).
Class X – April 7, 2010
CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS IN A POST-CONFLICT ENVIRONMENT BETWEEN PEACE AND WAR: Rebuilding and fighting simultaneously AFGHANISTAN 2
GUEST FACULTY: Dr. Andrew Wilder
Afghanistan Continued: Post-election in US through post election in Afghanistan
A. How have changed conditions in Afghanistan led to a changed overall policy and grand strategy? From where have the changes, if any, emanated, and what have been the major issues causing reconsideration? What kind of a process has taken place?
B. Should the events from 2005-2010 have been anticipated earlier? With what knowledge?
C. What have the major issues been?
D. As the Taliban insurgency has been able to increase use of force, and exercise increased power, how has ISAF changed its war-fighting and peacebuilding strategy and tactics? In what ways can these activities proceed simultaneously?
E. How have domestic politics within the United States and NATO nations affected the policy review?
READINGS
§ Wilder, Andrew and Sarah Lister. “State-Building at the Subnational Level in Afghanistan,” in Building State and Security in Afghanistan, Wolfgang Danspeckgruber and Robert P. Finn, eds, (Princeton: The Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, 2007), Chapter 6 (pp. 85-101). [Replace with new readings on hearts and minds].
§ Stewart, Rory, “Afghanistan: What Could Work,” The New York Review of Books, vol. 57, no. 1, January 14, 2010, http://www.nybooks.com/articles/23562.
§ Stewart, Rory, “The Irresistible Illusion,” London Review of Books, vol. 31, no. 13, July 9, 2009, http://www.lrb.co.uk/v31/n13/rory-stewart/the-irresistible-illusion.
§ Rubin, Barnett and Ahmed Rashid, “From Great Game to a Grand Bargain,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2008. Skim this reading.
§ General McChrystal, Stanley, “COMISAF’s Initial Assessment,” August 30, 2009.
OPTIONAL – BACKGROUND AND DEEPER READING
§ Rashid, Ahmed, Descent Into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia, (Viking: 2008).
§ Tellis, Ashley, “Reconciling with the Taliban?: Toward an Alternative Grand Strategy in Afghanistan,” Carnegie Report, April 2009, http://www.carnegieendowment.org/files/reconciling_with_taliban.pdf.
CLASS XI – April 14, 2010
CIVIL-MILITARY PLANNING, NETWORKING, ORGANIZATIONAL LEARNING AND INTERNAL REFORM
Possible roundtable discussion with Fletcher doctoral students Andrea Strimling and Susanna Campbell; Phillipe Rotmann of Kennedy School; Army “Lessons Learned” expert.
A. Theories of coordination
a. Why are organizations under-performing in peacebuilding, and possibly state-building?
b. The lack of systematic and sustained cooperation we observe in the field
B. Do hierarchical arrangements work as envisaged?
a. Does the UN SRSG system work adequately with its military? What military functions are not done?
b. Can organizations in the field operate successfully if “no one is in charge”? The conventional wisdom states there should be a focal point of responsibility.
c. But who would be in charge anyway in a tense situation that is neither war nor peace?
d. Should the military be expected to take on the peacebuilding tasks when none or few civilian organizations are available? How does good coordination and cooperation ever happen?
e. What happens to the NGOs and their fierce independence under a hierarchical system?
C. Peacebuilding organizations (or those who try to operate in an environment requiring efforts to build peace) and organizational learning.
a. Can “organizations”, as such, actually learn—or just the people in them? What happens to organizational learning as people rotate in and out?
b. Is there a different process in the attempt to achieve organizational learning between civil and military organizations? Can there be cross-organizational learning?
c. Should organizational learning take place at HQ or field level, or both? And if at both, what mechanisms for communicating the learning?
READINGS
§ Howard, Lise Morje, UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars, (Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 2008), (pp. 14-20).
§ Chayes, Antonia Handler and Abram Chayes, “Planning: the Gateway to Decentralization,” Planning for Intervention: International Cooperation in Conflict Management, (Kluwer Law International, 1999), Read pp. 149-154 only.
§ Campbell, Susanna P., (2008) “(Dis)integration, Incoherence and Complexity in UN Post-conflict Interventions,” International Peacekeeping, vol. 15, no. 4, (pp. 556-569).
§ Campbell, Susanna P. (2008) “When Process Matters: The Potential Implications of Organizational Learning for Peacebuilding Success,” Journal of Peacebuilding and Development, vol. 4, no. 2, (pp. 20-32).
§ Levitt, Barbara and James G. Marsh, “Organizational Learning” Annual Review of Sociology, vol. 14 (1988), (pp. 319-340).
OPTIONAL – BACKGROUND AND DEEPER READING
§ Rotmann, Phillipe, et. al. “Learning under fire: Progress and Dissent in the US Military.” Survival, vol. 51, no. 4, Aug/Sep 2009, (pp. 31-48).
CLASS XII – APRIL 21, 2010
DECENTRALIZATION TO THE FIELD: InnovationS
A. CMOC, CIMIC, PRTs, FETs
B. What is the function and effectiveness of PRTs given the levels of violence?
READINGS
§ Chayes, Antonia Handler and Abram Chayes. “Planned Decentralization: A Better Way,” Planning for Intervention: International Cooperation in Conflict Management, (Kluwer Law International, 1999), Chapter 3 (pp. 47-84).
§ Royal Danish Defence College. “Implementing the Comprehensive Approach in Helmand – Within the Context of Counterinsurgency.
§ RAND, Integrating Civilian Agencies and Stability Operations, (RAND, 2009), Chapter 6, (pp 121-156).
§ Provincial Reconstruction Teams: Lessons and Recommendations, Princeton University Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, January 2008, http://wws.princeton.edu/research/pwreports_f07/wws591b.pdf. Read pp. 1-18 and skim some of the cases in the annexes.
§ Ricks, Thomas, “Women in COIN (II): How to do it Right, October 9, 2009, http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/10/09/women_in_coin_ii_how_to_do_it_right.
OPTIONAL – BACKGROUND AND DEEPER READING
§ GAO, “Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan and Iraq,” GAO-08-905RSU (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 26, 2008).
§ ISAF PRT Handbook, Edition 3.
CLASS XIII – APRIL 24, 2010
NEW FORMS OF COOPERATION: PRT SIMULATION
READINGS TBA
CLASS XIV – APRIL 28, 2010
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